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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Rodriguez'
(decided August 31, 2010)
George Rodriguez faced criminal prosecution after police
found "significant amount[s] of marijuana and cocaine, along with
drug paraphernalia" in his apartment.2 At trial, Rodriguez argued the
evidence should have been suppressed because the police officers'
initial warrantless entry into his apartment constituted a violation of
his Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 3 and article
I, section 124 rights of the New York State Constitution.5 The court
held that "the police were presented with an emergency situation, jus-
tifying their warrantless entry into the defendant's apartment," and
therefore the defendant's "motion . . . to suppress physical evidence
[was] denied."6
On August 4, 2006, Officers Bellico and Hennessy received a
call "informing them of a stabbing in progress on the fifth floor of an
apartment complex."7 The officers responded and found the injured
defendant who "provided a description of his assailant."8 The defen-
dant contended that he did not live in the building and was walking
on the fifth floor when he was stopped and stabbed by another indi-
907 N.Y.S.2d 294 (App. Div. 2d Dep't. 2010).
2 Id. at 296.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause .... "
4 Article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution states, in relevant part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause . . . ."
5 Rodriguez, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
6 Id. at 303.
7 Id. at 295.
Id.
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vidual.9 After the defendant was transported to the hospital, the of-
ficer noticed a trail of blood "leading down to . . . the third floor" in
front of an apartment, later identified as that of the defendants."o Of-
ficer Hennessy, unable to receive a response from the apartment,
asked the superintendent to open the door." The officer believed this
was the most expeditious way to enter the apartment, as he was una-
ble to knock the door down on his own and an emergency services
unit would have taken about thirty minutes to arrive.12 After about
ten minutes, the officer was notified of the alleged assailant's de-
tainment and the superintendent arrived with the key for the door.'3
Upon entry into the apartment, the officer noticed additional blood in
the kitchen and living room, "but no other victims were found."l4
However, the search also revealed "a hydroponic tank with as many
as [twelve] pots containing marijuana plants inside."" Subsequently,
the officers obtained a warrant which turned up "significant
amount[s] of marijuana[,] . . . cocaine, . . . [and] drug parapherna-
lia."' 6
The People attempted to enter the marijuana, cocaine, and
other drug paraphernalia discovered at the defendant's apartment into
evidence.' 7 The People argued that although the evidence was ob-
tained after a warrantless entry into the defendant's apartment, it was
"justified under the emergency exception to the warrant require-
ment." 18
Mr. Rodriguez argued that "there was no report of a missing
person, and no reason for the officers to believe that there were more
than two people involved in the incident, both of whom had been ac-
counted for just prior to the officers' entry into [the] apartment."' 9 In
addition, the officer "demonstrated that there was no emergency,"
because the officer waited ten minutes to open the door instead of
9 Id at 295-96.
'0 Rodriguez, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
" Id.
12 id
13 Id.
14 id.
" Rodriguez, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
16 Id.
18 Id.
' Id. at 300.
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knocking it down. 20 Therefore, the People failed to satisfy the first
prong of the Mitchell analysis, which required "reasonable grounds to
believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for
[officer] assistance for the protection of life or property." 2' The New
York Court of Appeals promulgated this standard, establishing a
three prong test to determine whether an emergency situation justi-
fied a warrantless entry into a protected space.22 The hearing court
agreed with the defendant and held that the physical evidence should
have been suppressed because the People failed to satisfy the first
prong of the Mitchell test.23
The appellate division reversed the holding of the hearing
court,24 and analyzed the facts under Mitchell's three prong test.25
First, it was reasonable for the police to believe an emergency existed
where "a person had just been violently stabbed," the defendant had
been disingenuous about where the attack occurred, and there was a
large trail of blood leading up to a blood stained apartment door.26
Additionally, the circumstances prevented Officer Hennessy from ob-
taining information which may have convinced him that an emergen-
cy did not exist. 27 Furthermore, although the officer waited ten mi-
nutes, the court believed this was the most expedient avenue provided
for opening the door.28 The third prong of the analysis was satisfied
20 Rodriguez, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
21 Id at 297 (quoting People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
22 See Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609. The court held that the following elements must be
satisfied in order to constitute an emergency:
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an
emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the
protection of life or property. (2) The search must not be primarily mo-
tivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. (3) There must be some
reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emer-
gency with the area or place to be searched.
Id.
23 Rodriguez, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
24 Id. at 303.
25 Id. at 301-03.
26 Id. at 299. See also United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 443 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
that it was reasonable for an officer to believe that a trail of blood indicated someone's life
was in immediate danger).
27 Rodriguez, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 301 ("The defendant never indicated how many people
were stabbed, and, having been taken by ambulance, [the defendant] was not there for [Of-
ficer] Hennessy to ask any additional questions.").
28 id
3
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because the trail of blood leading to the blood-stained door gave the
police a "reasonable basis . . . to associate the emergency with the in-
side of [the] apartment." 29  Nonetheless, the second prong of the
analysis required a greater degree of scrutiny.
Under the Mitchell standard, the second prong requires the
use of a subjective standard when determining whether "[t]he search
... [was] primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evi-
dence."30 However, the United States Supreme Court, in Brigham
City v. Stuart, 3 recently held that "[t]he officer's subjective motiva-
tion is irrelevant." 32  This represents a clear contradiction, yet the
court in Rodriguez refused to opine as to whether the New York Con-
stitution required the removal of the subjective standard.33 Instead,
the court held that both standards had been satisfied.34 Therefore, the
court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.
A divergence of opinion exists within the New York court
system. Some courts have adopted the Supreme Court's less restric-
tive objective standard, 36 others have retained the subjective test,37
and some have failed to determine whether an objective or subjective
standard should be applied to the second prong of the Mitchell analy-
sis. 38
The Fourth Amendment essentially provides "that [any]
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presump-
tively unreasonable." 39 However, "the ultimate touchstone for the
Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,' " which has caused the crea-
tion of several exceptions.40 These exceptions exist under "exigent
29 id.
30 Id. at 297 (quoting Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609) (internal quotation marks omitted).
" 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
32 Rodriguez, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 297. (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404 ) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
3 Id.
34 Id. at 295.
3 Id at 304.
36 See, e.g., People v. Leggett, 904 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010); People
v. Denis, 909 N.Y.S.2d 325, 328 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2010); People v. Fallucchi, 865
N.Y.S.2d 874, 876 (Watertown City Ct. 2009).
3 See, e.g., People v. Liggins, 883 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2009); People
v. Stevens, 871 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2008).
38 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 297; People v. Dallas, 865 N.E.2d 1, 2 (N.Y.
2007); People v. Desmarat, 833 N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007).
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
40 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14 (1999)
672 [Vol. 27
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circumstances," which may include situations such as fires, police
chases, or the need to assist someone "seriously injured or threatened
with such injury."4 1 Many contentious legal battles are fought on this
issue, because oftentimes, highly probative and damaging evidence
may be found after a warrantless entry. If the prosecution can argue
that an emergency situation existed, the Fourth Amendment no longer
provides protection to the defendant against any incriminating evi-
dence placed in the "plain view" of the officer.4 2 The process by
which an emergency situation is determined has been debated
amongst the federal courts for numerous years, until the Supreme
Court's decision in Brigham City.43
In Brigham City, "four police officers responded to a [com-
plaint] regarding a loud party."" After arriving at the residence, the
officers proceeded up the driveway to investigate.45 Moving through
the backyard, the officers witnessed underage drinking and an alter-
cation taking place in the kitchen of the home.4 6 During the alterca-
tion, one of the juveniles struck a victim in the face, causing him to
spit up blood.4 7 Then, one of the officers quickly entered the kitchen
to quell the violence.48 Subsequently, the defendants were arrested
and charged with "contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disor-
derly conduct, and intoxication." 4 9 At trial, the defendants attempted
to suppress the evidence, "arguing that the warrantless entry [of the
(per curium)).
41 Id. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510 (1978) (holding the warrantless
search and seizure was objectively reasonable to prevent the imminent destruction of evi-
dence); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 54-55 (1963) (holding engagement in a "hot pursuit"
reasonably eliminates the necessity for a warrant).
42 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (holding "[u]nder [the plain
view] doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its in-
criminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of
access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant").
43 Compare United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
"absent probable cause, examining a government actor's motivation for conducting an emer-
gency search provides a necessary safeguard against pretextual . . . interests to serve criminal
investigation and law enforcement functions"), with People v. Lewis, 845 N.E.2d 39, 54 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2006) ("[H]olding that the officer's motives are legally irrelevant to the validity of
an emergency-assistance search .... ).
4 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400-01.
45 Id. at 401.
46 id
47 Id.
48 id.
49 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 401.
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police officers] violated the Fourth Amendment."5 0
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the State's argument and
explained that the emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement was inapplicable."' The court explained, " 'a
reasonable person would [not] believe that the entry was necessary to
prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons.' "52 In addi-
tion, the Utah court accepted the defendants' argument that the police
were motivated to make an arrest and not to stop the impending vi-
olence.53
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the judgment
of the Utah Supreme Court, and remanded for further proceedings.5 4
First, the Court rejected the subjective requirement of an officer's
motivations.5 5  The only relevant inquiry was whether the circums-
tances surrounding the officer created a situation justifying police ac-
tion.5 6 Under the circumstances of an ongoing altercation, the offic-
ers could have reasonably believed the altercation could have become
violent and assistance was necessary to avert serious bodily injury.
However, the officer's subjective motivations have no bearing on the
ultimate determination of the case. The Court argued, "[t]he role of
a peace officer . . . [is] not simply rendering first aid to casualties; an
officer is not like a boxing . . . referee, poised to stop a bout only if it
becomes too one-sided." 5 9
Although the Court adopted an objective standard to deter-
mine whether an emergency situation existed, the determination of
50 id
51 id.
52 Id. at 402.
5 Id at 404.
54 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 407.
5 Id. at 404. See also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 n.2 (2000) (stating the
"issue is not [the officer's] state of mind, but the objective effect of his actions").
56 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
s7 Id. at 406.
8 Id. at 404-05.
5 Id. at 406. See also id. at 409 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Federal interests are not of-
fended when a single State elects to provide greater protection for its citizens than the Feder-
al Constitution requires."); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("Recognizing
that we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual
motivations of individual officers .... ). However, Whren only addressed situations involv-
ing administrative searches based upon probable cause and not searches prompted by an
emergency situation. Id. at 811-12; Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978) ("Sub-
jective intent alone .. . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.").
674 (Vol. 27
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what may or may not be an emergency was continually evolving.60
Akin to Brigham City, the Supreme Court continued to expand the
definition of the emergency doctrine's application in Michigan v.
Fisher.6 1
In Fisher, officers approached a house with "a pickup truck in
the driveway with its front smashed, damaged fenceposts . . . [and]
three broken house windows."62 In addition, the officers observed
blood on the hood of the truck and one of the doors of the house.63
After peering into the home, officers noticed that Jeremy Fisher "had
a cut on his hand, and they asked him whether he needed medical at-
tention."" Fisher angrily told the authorities that they should go ob-
tain a search warrant.65 Officer Goolsby attempted to open the front
door, but the defendant threatened the officer by "pointing a long gun
at him." 66 Eventually, after police retreated and returned, Fisher was
charged with "assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony."67
The trial court suppressed evidence obtained by the officers
on Fourth Amendment grounds.68 The Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed, arguing that the situation did not rise to that of an emergen-
cy because the blood found was corroborated by the cut on the defen-
dant's hand and the injury was not life threatening.69
The Supreme Court granted "the State's petition for certiorari
and reverse[ed],"70 stating: "Officers do not need ironclad proof of 'a
likely serious, life-threatening' injury to invoke the emergency aid
60 See United States v. Martin, 781 F.2d 671, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an of-
ficer's warrantless search was justified after receiving a report of an explosion and an injured
victim); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) ("[T]he seriousness of the offense un-
der investigation itself [does not] create[] exigent circumstances of the kind that under the
Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search."); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99
(1967) (holding police officers in hot pursuit of a suspect were justified in their warrantless
entry of the home); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (holding warrantless
searches are reasonable to "prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime").
61 130 S. Ct. 546 (2009) (per curiam).
62 Id. at 547.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
6 Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 547.
67 Id
68 Id.
6 Id. at 549.
70 Id. at 548.
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exception." 7  Since the police observed the defendant throwing pro-
jectiles, it was reasonable to believe that those projectiles had a "hu-
man target . . . or that Fisher would hurt himself in the course of his
rage."7
The emergence of these two decisions in the Supreme Court
has produced little change amongst the federal courts.73 In United
States v. Klump,74 the defendant was charged and convicted of "one
count of manufacturing 1,000 or more marijuana plants, . . . possess-
ing with intent to distribute 1,000 or more marijuana plants, and one
count of possessing a semiautomatic assault weapon in furtherance of
a drug-trafficking crime.",7  During the surveillance operation lead-
ing to the arrest of the defendant, officers followed a white van to a
warehouse owned by the defendant.76 Surveillance of the warehouse
revealed small traces of marijuana from departing vehicles. After
smelling smoke from the warehouse, agents called the fire depart-
ment and accompanied the firefighters inside where they located ap-
proximately three hundred marijuana plants.78 Based on their obser-
vations, the agents obtained a search warrant which lead to the
seizure of "1,044 marijuana plants and a semi-automatic [weapon]." 79
The defendant, Klump, argued that the evidence should have
been suppressed because the search warrant was granted based upon
n' Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 549 (citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406).
72 Id. See also id at 550-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The State bears the burden of proof
... and relied entirely on the testimony of Officer Goolsby in its attempt to carry that bur-
den. ... Goolsby was not sure about certain facts .... [and] it is hard to see how the Court is
justified in micromanaging the day-to-day ... fact-intensive decisions of this kind.").
73 See United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating the test for
determining whether an emergency situation existed "is an objective one that turns on the
district court's examination of the totality of the circumstances confronting law enforcement
agents in the particular case"); see also Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (2d Cir.
1970). The court held that the following elements were relevant in determining whether an
emergency situation existed: (1) "[if] a grave offense is involved, particularly one that is a
crime of violence"; (2) "[if] the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed"; (3) "a clear
showing of probable cause . . . that the suspect committed the crime"; (4) "[a] strong reason
to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered"; (5) a likelihood that the suspect
will escape if not swiftly apprehended"; and (6) "that the entry, though not consented, is
made peaceably." Id. at 392-93.
74 536 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2008).
" Id. at 115.
76 Id.
n Id.
7 Id. at 116.
7 Klump, 536 F.3d at 116.
676 [Vol. 27
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a warrantless search by the agents.80 The core question the court ana-
lyzed was "whether the facts, as they appeared at the moment of en-
try, would lead a reasonable, experienced officer to believe that there
was an 'urgent need to render aid or take action.' "8 ' The Second
Circuit found that it was objectively reasonable for an officer of simi-
lar experience who smelt a strange, oily, electrical odor to believe it
was necessary to enter the warehouse.82 The court also dismissed
any investigation of the officer's subjective motivations, based upon
the Brigham City holding.83
The previous analysis represents a clear recognition of Su-
preme Court precedent. However, unlike the federal courts, New
York courts have failed to come to a clear consensus as to retaining
the subjective standard or adopting the Supreme Court's objective
test. Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution is most often
read in part and parcel with the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution." Both forbid warrantless searches and seizures
of persons or places and afford greater protection to the home.
However, article I, section 12 grants even greater protection to New
York State citizens by shielding them "against unreasonable intercep-
tion of telephone and telegraph communications."86 Although the
New York courts fail to provide a clear answer, states are free to af-
ford greater protections to their citizens (i.e. the subjective standard),
but no less than those that are afforded by the United States Constitu-
tion.
The three prong test set forth in Mitchell, which includes a
subjective analysis, is still used by New York courts. On December
80 Id
81 Id. at 117-18 (quoting United States v. MacDonald 916 F.2d at 769) (citations omitted).
82 Idatl18.
83 Id. at 118-19. See also United States v. McNeill, 285 Fed. App'x. 975, 979 (3d Cir.
2008) (holding it was objectively reasonable for officers to believe a "third party could be in
imminent danger[,] [wihen the police arrived at the motel" and one party was bleeding and
the other party was covered in blood); United States v. Wilson, 273 Fed. App'x. 356, 357
(5th Cir. 2008) (stating the defendant's desire to seek testimony showing the officers desired
to seize evidence from his motel room was irrelevant); United States v. Huffman, 461 F.3d
777, 784-85 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding it was objectively reasonable for officers warrantless
entry into a home reporting shots fired and riddled with bullet holes).
8 See generally People v. Knapp, 422 N.E.2d 531, 533 (N.Y. 1981) ("[Olur Constitutions
accord special protection to a person's expectation of privacy in his own home.").
8s Id. at 533-34.
86 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
8 347 N.E.2d at 609.
9
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30, 1972, a hotel chambermaid went missing." The desk clerk con-
tacted the police, and two patrol officers arrived to help conduct the
search."9 Shortly thereafter, Detective O'Neill arrived to help search
for the maid.90 Unfortunately, the detective entered the defendant's
room and discovered the chambermaid's corpse in the closet. 9' At
trial, the defendant attempted to suppress the evidence, arguing the
detective's entry into his room violated the Fourth Amendment. 92
The judge denied the request, and the jury convicted the defendant of
murder.93 After an affirmance by the appellate division, the defen-
dant was granted leave to appeal. 94
The court of appeals held the search did not implicate the
Fourth Amendment because it was triggered by an emergency situa-
tion.95 In order to help courts decipher when an exigent or emergen-
cy situation existed, the court provided three guidelines. 96
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that there is an emergency at hand and an imme-
diate need for their assistance for the protection of life
or property. (2) The search must not be primarily mo-
tivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. (3)
There must be some reasonable basis, approximating
probable cause, to associate the emergency with the
area or place to be searched. 97
Under the first prong, there was an objectively reasonable be-
lief that there was an emergency because the maid had been missing
for several hours, which lead to the assumption that she had suffered
some misfortune. 9 8 The court believed that the detective's primary
motivation when entering the defendant's room was to provide assis-
tance to the maid and not to obtain incriminating evidence, thereby
88 Id. at 608.
89 id.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 609.
92 Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609.
93Id.
94 id
9 Id.96 id
96Id
9 Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609.
98 Id. at 610.
678 [Vol. 27
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satisfying the second prong of the test.99 Finally, the area searched
was on the sixth floor of the hotel, the last known whereabouts of the
maid, satisfying prong three. 00
After Brigham City, the New York Court of Appeals has
failed to decide whether Mitchell's second prong should remain in-
tact.101 However, the appellate division has provided some direction
by ratifying the objective standard in its analyses of the emergency
doctrine.'02
In Desmarat, police responded to a call and found "a body ly-
ing near the rear fire exit door of a motel."l 03 Concurrently, the of-
ficers noticed "bloody drag marks [inside the motel] leading to the
area near room 210.",104 The officers knocked on the door, but re-
ceived no response.'os After an employee opened the door, police
cordoned off the area and seized corroborating evidence linking the
defendant to the crime.106 The trial court denied the suppression of
the evidence, ruling the "seizure was proper under the emergency ex-
ception to the warrant requirement." 0 7 On appeal, the appellate divi-
sion accepted the holding in Brigham City, yet failed to address
"whether the New York State Constitution require[d] retention of the
Mitchell standard."' 08 The court stated: "[T]he objective facts ob-
served by the police provided them with a reasonable basis to believe
that an emergency was at hand, that other persons may have been at
risk of injury, and that the emergency was associated with Room
210." 109
Although Desmarat has received positive treatment within the
New York court system, it failed to provide any coherent answer to
9 Id.
100 Id.
'ot See Dallas, 865 N.E.2d at 2 ("We have no occasion to consider whether our holding in
Mitchell should be modified in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Brigham City.").
102 See Desmarat, 833 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
103 Id. at 560.
104 id.
1os id
106 Id. at 560-61.
107 Desmarat, 833 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
108 Id See also People v. Leggett, 904 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010)
(holding the subjective element of the Mitchell test would be replaced by the objective stan-
dard promulgated by the Supreme Court).
109 Desmarat, 833 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
11
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obvious inconsistencies in the state and federal standards. 1 0 This has
forced trial courts to decide whether the federal decision requires the
modification of the Mitchell standard."' Some courts have chosen to
retain the subjective standard of the Mitchell test until the New York
Court of Appeals takes up the issue, while others have relinquished
the subjective standard."12
In People v. Saldana," the defendant's home caught fire.114
After the fire was extinguished, the fire department told Officer
March "there was something [he] should see in the attic."'" Upon
entering the attic, Officer March saw approximately fifteen marijuana
plants.11 6 After questioning the homeowner about the plants, he ad-
mitted to "cultivating marijuana for personal use.""' Subsequently,
the police arrested the defendant "for marijuana cultivation and is-
sued him an appearance ticket."" 8 The court found that the officer's
warrantless search violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures."19 "First, no emergency
existed[]" upon the officer's search.120 More importantly, the court
recognized the second prong of the Mitchell analysis by stating that
the officer's "intent was to investigate a crime, not to provide emer-
gency services."l21
Other courts have taken a different approach, by relying on
the Leggett and Desmarat analyses, which eliminate the use of Mit-
110 Id. (stating that the court would not rule on whether the New York State Constitution
required retention of the subjective test of the Mitchell standard).
" See, e.g., People v. Dillon, 844 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007) (holding
"the firefighters were presented with an emergency which permitted their warrantless entry
and search under both the Mitchell test and the rule adopted by the United states Supreme
Court").
112 See, e.g., Leggett, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 774; Denis, 909 N.Y.S.2d at 329; Fallucchi, 906
N.Y.S.2d at 875 (holding the subjective standard should not be retained). But see, e.g., Lig-
gins, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 417-18; Stevens, 871 N.Y.S.2d at 527 (holding the subjective standard
should be retained).
" 906 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Watertown City Ct. 2009).
114 Id. at 775.
" Id.
116 Id
"' Saldana, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
119 Id
120 Id See also People v. Guins, 569 N.Y.S.2d 541, 552-53 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1991)
(holding the emergency doctrine was not applicable to contraband found in a post-fire arson
investigation in the defendant's home).
121 Saldana, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
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chell's subjective standard.122 In People v. Fallucchi,123 police re-
sponded to a call about an intoxicated male operating a black motor
vehicle.124 Upon arriving at the first reported location of the vehicle,
the car was no longer there.12 Then, the search brought the police to
a street address with a vehicle fitting the description parked in the
driveway. 126 After arriving, the police arrested the defendant and
charged him with driving while intoxicated and per se aggravated
driving while intoxicated.127  The defendant sought to suppress the
blood test results and any statements he made to the police.128 The
trial court held that "the warrantless arrest of the defendant was in vi-
olation of his Fourth Amendment rights, thus requiring . .. [any] evi-
dence seized [to] be suppressed." 29 The court recognized that "the
second subjective test [had been] eliminated" and only analyzed the
first and third prongs of the Mitchell test. 130 The analysis revealed a
failure to find the existence of any objective emergency requiring the
officer's entry into the defendant's home.' 3'
The pertinent questions now become: What is the utility of
the subjective standard and can it find its place under the Supreme
Court's objective test? Throughout recent decisions, including Ro-
driguez, it has become markedly clear that these two tests may pro-
duce strikingly similar results. 3 2 It may be possible to conclude that
elimination of the subjective analysis would not lead to a greater like-
lihood of evidence being admitted from an officer's warrantless en-
try.
Although the Brigham City and Mitchell tests are different, it
can be argued that the two standards are reconcilable. This reconcili-
ation of the two standards is exemplified in the Rodriguez case,
122 See Leggett, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 774; Desmarat, 833 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
123 865 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Yates Cnty. Ct. 2008).
124 Id. at 875.
125 id
126 Id. at 876.
127 Id. at 875.
128 Fallucchi at 876.
129 Id. at 877.
30 Id at 876.
131 id.
132 See Desmarat, 833 N.Y.S.2d at 561 (stating that "under the circumstances, the police
were presented with an emergency situation under both the Mitchell rule and the Brigham
City rule"); see also Rodriguez, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 297 (holding that an emergency situation
existed under both tests).
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where the court concluded both tests could be fulfilled.'33 The first
prong of the Mitchell analysis requires that "[t]he police must have
reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and
an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or
property." 34 If the first prong of the analysis was satisfied, it would
provide the ultimate contradiction to argue that the officer then was
motivated to seize evidence. In addition, if a jury were to conclude
there were no objectively reasonable grounds to believe an emergen-
cy existed, then this would constitute an implied assertion that either
the officer misread the situation or the officer may have been moti-
vated for other reasons. These may be reasonable interpretations;
however, the reconciliation of the two standards may leave room for
abuse under situations which may be less apparent as emergencies.
Arguably, the objective standard may be overly broad, giving
police more freedom to act arbitrarily in more controversial emergen-
cy situations. Law enforcement would be given the freedom to over-
look the possibility of further legal implications for its actions. The
New York court system would no longer be able to provide a check
on this type of abuse and investigate the officer's true motivations.
Interestingly, the New York Court of Appeals may have intended this
subjective analysis to be a balancing test for situations which are not
perceptibly emergencies. If the trier of fact was uncertain, they may
use the subjective intent of the officer as the determining factor. This
creates a situation in which the subjective intent of the officer is in-
creasingly relevant to the decision of an objective emergency. More
or less, the first and second prongs of the analysis may become cohe-
sive as opposed to independent analyses.
Based upon the foregoing analysis it becomes apparent that
the two tests are irreconcilable. Understandably, both tests are likely
to find the same result nine out of ten times. In addition, under most
conditions, the quality and professionalism of the police force is un-
likely to be motivated for any other reason than to protect and serve
the public. Therefore, any emergency would produce the same result
under both tests. However, there will be circumstances which require
additional scrutiny. Under those circumstances, the second prong's
subjective analysis will help ensure the steadfast protection of our
Fourth Amendment rights. Even as the analysis will be relatively fu-
Rodriguez, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
134 Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609.
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tile in most cases, its main purpose will be for those situations where
the question becomes whether an emergency existed under less evi-
dent circumstances. For that reason alone, the subjective test should
continue to be employed.
The Rodriguez case may acquire some influence in the state
courts. Ostensibly, the decision will probably not influence courts to
relinquish or maintain the subjective test under Mitchell. However,
courts which would have otherwise sided with the Supreme Court
may instead be pushed into failing to take a position. In that instance,
the effect will likely be to force the New York Court of Appeals to
rule on the issue and decide once and for all whether their citizens
should be provided with increased protection via the subjective test.
The Fourth Amendment is one of society's most deeply held
rights. There is no more profound thought than the safety inside
one's home. That right does not exist to protect the criminals and law
breakers of society, but stands as a wall of protection to those indi-
viduals who choose to abide by the law. In a judicial system that fa-
vors innocence over guilt, there should be no parsing of this right to
the detriment of the free and the veracious. By reaffirming the Mit-
chell standard's precedent in the New York court system, it will
achieve the dual purpose of providing full protection under the law to
the citizenry and maintaining a safe and orderly society. The New
York courts would be foolish to dispose of this time tested and prov-
en standard.
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